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INTRA-RACIAL, COLOR-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND THE
NEED FOR THEORETICAL CONSISTENCY AFTER
WALKER V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
I. INTRODUCTION
Our nation's courts have struggled for years with the interpretation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) I and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (section 1981),2 two federal civil rights statutes that provide rem-
edies for both public and private acts of discrimination. Title VII makes
it unlawful for an employer to engage in certain discriminatory employ-
ment practices which are motivated by an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.3 Section 1981, derived from the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, provides a means of redress for those
individuals who have been denied certain rights "enjoyed by white citi-
zens." 4 The combined scope of these two federal statutes provides
broad protection against many forms of discrimination.5 The difficulty
in the interpretation of these two statutes has arisen from the vague
wording of section 1981 and from judicial confusion as to the intent of
the drafters in enacting Title VII.6
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
2. Id. § 1981.
3. Id. § § 2000e-2000e-17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Employer Practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
4. Id. § 1981. Section 1981 had its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and was later reenacted in 1870 after the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment. C. ANTEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 19 (2d ed. 1980). Section
1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
5. See generally C. ANTIEAU, supra note 4.
6. This difficulty can be seen when one compares the various decisions ren-
dered by different courts on the same § 1981 or Title VII issue. Compare Brown
v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (Title VII establishes exclu-
sive remedy for employment discrimination directed against federal employee)
(983)
1
Robson: Intra-Racial, Color-Based Discrimination and the Need for Theoret
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Recently, the emergence of a new form of discrimination has sorely
tested the limits of these two civil rights statutes and has become a per-
sistent quandary for the nation's courts. It has been termed intra-racial,
color-based discrimination, and it involves discrimination by a member
of one race against a member of the same race because of a difference in
skin color between the two. It is an atypical form of discrimination, one
that was likely never contemplated by the drafters of the civil rights stat-
utes.7 Generally, such claims of discrimination have failed under a sec-
tion 1981 analysis because that statute traditionally has been available
only for claims of discrimination based on race, and not color.8 The same
result has occurred under Title VII as well because, although the statute
specifically refers to "color" discrimination as a prohibited activity, it
has generally been applied only to cases of discrimination by an individ-
ual of one color directed at an individual of another color, where the two
are also members of different races. 9 Yet, litigants have continually
sought out these two statutes to remedy intra-racial, color-based dis-
crimination even after a series of decisions denying their availability as
statutory remedies.' 0 Perhaps their attractiveness to potential litigants
with Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.
1982) (federal employee may utilize § 1981 as well as Title VII in action for
employment discrimination against labor union); compare Anderson v. General
Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 648 F.2d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 1981) (provi-
sions in Title VII governing accommodations made for employee's religious be-
liefs do not violate establishment clause of first amendment), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982) with Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (religious accommodation provision of Title VII violates establish-
ment clause of first amendment); compare Waller v. International Harvester Co.,
578 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (§ 1981 applies only to race discrimina-
tion, not to discrimination on basis of color) with Vigil v. City of Denver, 15
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8000, at 6938 (D. Colo. 1977) (§ 1981 does prohibit
discrimination on basis of color); compare Jones v. United Gas Improvement
Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (§ 1981 does not supply remedy for reli-
gious discrimination) with Marlowe v. General Motors Corp., 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1160, 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (§ 1981 provides protection from dis-
crimination based on religion).
7. This is an atypical form of discrimination because it does not involve
traditional notions of discrimination between the races. Rather, the discrimina-
tory acts reflect intra-racial hostilities, perhaps resulting from the difference in
treatment that members of the same race often receive based on the similarity or
dissimilarity of their skin color to the majority group's skin color,
8. See Sere v. Board of Trustees, 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(plaintiff's claims dismissed because § 1981 not available for claims of intra-ra-
cial, color-based discrimination), aff'd, 852 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988); Waller, 578
F. Supp. at 314 (plaintiff's claims dismissed because color not cognizable claim
under § 1981 and plaintiff did not prove racial discrimination existed).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. EEOC, No. 83-2531 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (Title VII not available as remedy for intra-racial, color-
based discrimination).
10. See Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546 (denying § 1981 availability as statutory
remedy); Waller, 578 F. Supp. at 314 (same); Brown, No. 83-2531 (denying Title
VII as statutory remedy).
[Vol. 35: p. 983
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lies in the fact that both statutes easily could be interpreted by the courts
to cover this type of discrimination.I'
The courts' unwillingness to extend section 1981 and Title VII cov-
erage to intra-racial, color-based discrimination is not the result of a di-
rect mandate from Congress, but rather stems from judicial
interpretation of these statutes. Apparently the courts have determined
that Congress, because of its silence on the issue, did not intend these
statutes to extend to this type of discrimination, or at the very least the
courts were sufficiently confused about the issue to justify denying the
extension. Civil rights litigants, however, have continued to press for a
broader reading of the statutes, particularly Title VII.
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia recently
confronted a claim of intra-racial, color-based discrimination in the con-
text of a Title VII discriminatory termination of employment action. In
Walker v. Internal Revenue Service,' 2 the plaintiff, a light-skinned black wo-
man, sued her employer under Title VII and section 1981,13 alleging
that her dark-skinned black supervisor terminated her employment be-
cause of her lighter skin pigmentation.14 The employer moved for sum-
mary judgment with respect to each of the plaintiff's claims. 15 The
court granted the motion as to the section 1981 claims and denied it
with respect to the Title VII claims, allowing the plaintiff to prove her
case. 16 Consequently, Walker represents the first decision by a court,
since the enactment of Title VII allowing a plaintiff to sue a member of
the same race for color-based discrimination. Since the reason many
courts gave for refusing to allow such a cause of action in the past was
the lack of supporting precedent, Walker will be an important watershed
case for future discrimination plaintiffs.
This Note will briefly visit the chief cases in this area, highlighting
11. For a discussion of the reasons why Title VII and § 1981 would serve as
effective remedies for intra-racial, color-based discrimination, see infra notes 98-
136 and accompanying text.
12. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
13. Walker also sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). The court affirmed the Magistrate's recommendation
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim because
"[tihe APA does not create substantive rights on which a claim for relief can be
based." Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 409 (citations omitted).
14. Valker, 713 F. Supp. at 404-05. For a further discussion of the facts of
W1'alker, see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
15. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405. The case was originally heard by a magis-
trate, following the usual procedure for Title VII cases. Id. The magistrate rec-
ommended granting summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's
claims under § 1981 and the Administrative Procedure Act, as well as under the
plaintiff's Title VII invidious discrimination claim. Id.
16. Id. at 408-09. As to the Title VII claims, the district court recognized
the substantial problems of proof involved, but concluded that the plaintiff had
presented a factual issue that could not be reached by summary judgment. Id. at
408. The case ultimately went to trial on the merits in February. 1990.
9851990] NOTE
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decisions that address the availability of Title VII and section 1981 to
remedy color-based discrimination, both inter-racial and intra-racial."7
Further, this Note will discuss the Walker court's solution to the complex
problem of intra-racial, color-based discrimination. 18 Finally, this Note
will suggest approaches to analyzing both Title VII and section 1981
intra-racial, color-based discrimination suits.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Initial Hurdle: Color as a Cognizable Claim
In light of the judicial interpretations. of Title VII and section 1981,
a plaintiff's goal in an intra-racial, color-based discrimination suit is to
convince the court that a claim of color-based discrimination between
members of the same race is actionable. The initial hurdle in such a suit,
however, is to first persuade the court that color-based discrimination
between members of different races is a cognizable claim under section
1981 or Title VII.
Section 1981 does not mention the word "color," but rather pro-
vides a remedy to an aggrieved individual who has been denied certain
rights "enjoyed by white citizens." °2 0 Most courts have construed this
phrase to mean that discrimination on the basis of color, as opposed to
race, is not actionable. 2' This construction was inevitable given the
United States Supreme Court's analysis of the language. The Court has
stated that the words "enjoyed by white citizens" were added to the
original house bill to "emphasize the racial character of the rights being
protected." 22
Other courts, however, have taken a broader view of the scope of
section 1981. For instance, in Vigil v. City of Denver,2 3 a Mexican-Ameri-
17. For a discussion of the cases deciding the question of Title VII and
§ 1981 applicability to color discrimination, see infra notes 20-48 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of the Walker court's solution, see infra notes 57-84 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of suggested approaches to Title VII and § 1981 cases,
see infra notes 97-136 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). For the relevant text of§ 1981, see supra note
4. For a discussion of one interpretation of rights "enjoyed by white citizens,"
see infra note 12 1.
21. See, e.g., Waller v. International Harvester Co., 578 F. Supp. 309 (N.D.
11. 1984). In Waller, the plaintiff, a black employee, brought a § 1981 action
alleging that his employer purposely discriminated against him and in favor of
other employees because of his race and color. Id. at 313. The plaintiff believed
that he was denied training, promotion and transfer privileges because of his
race and color, while others of different races and colors received such privi-
leges. Id. at 313-14. The district court did not allow the plaintiff to bring the
§ 1981 action because "[slection 1981 applies only to race discrimination, not to
discrimination on the basis of color." Id. at 314.
22. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) (emphasis added).
23. 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8000 (D. Colo. 1977).
986 [Vol. 35: p. 983
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can plaintiff sought to use section 1981 to charge the city with discrimi-
nation on the basis of color.24 The Vigil court allowed the plaintiff to
proceed on his color discrimination theory, recognizing that although
most discrimination against Mexican-Americans was based on their na-
tional origin, "at least in this area [Denver], Mexican-Americans are sub-
ject to color-based discrimination and are within the coverage of
§ 1981."25 The court did not elaborate on why it took the view that
section 1981 covers discrimination on the basis of color other than to
say: "We note that skin color may vary significantly among individuals
who are considered 'blacks' or 'whites'; both these groups are protected
by § 1981, and § 1981 is properly asserted where discrimination on the
basis of color is alleged." 26
Title VII, in contrast, prohibits employment practices that discrimi-
nate on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 27 Yet
in spite of the literal inclusion of "color" in Title VII, some Title VII
defendants have been successful in arguing that color discrimination
does not provide the basis for a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Typically, the theory advanced is that although Title VII specifically in-
cludes color as an impermissible employment criterion, the term gener-
24. Id. at 6938. The plaintiff chose this route because of the then-prevail-
ing judicial view that § 1981 did not provide a remedy for claims of discrimina-
tion on the basis of national origin. Id. at 6939; see Petrone v. City of Reading,
541 F. Supp. 735, 738-39 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (national origin discrimination not
actionable under § 1981); Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 382
(S.D. Ala. 1979) (same); Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786,
786-89 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (same); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68
F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same); Schetter v. Heim, 300 F. Supp. 1070, 1073
(E.D. Wis. 1969) (same).
25. Vigil, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8000, at 6938-39.
26. Id. at 6938. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. as authority for the proposition that § 1981
covers discrimination on the basis of color. Id. (citing Santa Fe, 427 U.S. 273
(1976)). That decision lends little support for the court's conclusion, however.
In Santa Fe, white employees of the defendant-company were fired for misappro-
priating cargo, but a black employee charged with the same offense had been
retained by the company. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 276. The white employees
brought a § 1981 action claiming discrimination on the basis of race. Id. The
Court held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment
against whites as well as nonwhites. Id. at 287. This does not specifically ad-
dress the issue of whether § 1981 is a remedy for color discrimination, however,
because Santa Fe involved a suit by white workers alleging discrimination be-
cause of their race, not their color. Id. at 276. Thus the Court was concerned
with racial discrimination, and did not focus on color discrimination. This is best
illustrated by the Supreme Court's own framing of the issue: "[W]e must decide
whether § 1981, which provides that '[aill persons . . .shall have the same right
... to make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed by white citizens...' affords
protection from racial discrimination in private employment to white persons as
well as nonwhites." Id. (emphasis added).
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ally has been interpreted as synonymous with race. 28 Thus, color
discrimination is not an actionable claim in and of itself, independent of
a claim of race discrimination. This argument was advanced by the de-
fendant in Felix v. Marquez,29 a color-based discrimination suit in which
the plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against by her employer,
the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The defendant coun-
tered that Title VII, in reality, does not encompass color discrimina-
tion.30 The Felix court found the plaintiff's argument more persuasive,
however, saying that "[c]olor may be a rare claim, because color is usu-
ally mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination, but
considering the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto
Rico, color may be the most practical claim to present.",3'
B. The Intra-racial/Inter-racial Color-Based Discrimination Dichotomy
If a potential claimant can surmount the initial hurdle of the availa-
bility of section 1981 or Title VII to remedy color-based discrimination,
there still remains a substantial obstacle to overcome. Many courts re-
fuse to allow a cause of action for intra-racial, color-based discrimina-
tion, even if they do accept the premise that section 1981 and/or Title
VII provide a remedy for inter-racial, color-based discrimination. 32
Those courts that refuse to read Title VII to include intra-racial, color-
28. For example, the defendant in Walker argued that "[a]lthough the Act
includes 'color' as one of the bases for prohibited discrimination, the term has
generally been interpreted to mean the same thing as race." Defendant's Mem-
orandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Walker v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (No. 87-1789) [hereinafter
Defendant's Memorandum] (citation omitted).
29. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,279 (D.D.C. 1980).
30. Id. The court noted with some acrimony that the defendant-employer
was "so aware of the existence of color discrimination in Puerto Rico that the
[employer] proposed to study such discrimination." Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Brown v. EEOC, No. 83-2531 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). In Brown, the plaintiff claimed that the New York State
Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR) improperly conducted an investigation
into a charge he had filed alleging discriminatory hiring practices by Exxon En-
terprises. Id. at 4. A NYSDHR Specialist determined that there was no probable
cause to believe that Exxon had engaged in any discriminatory practices because
Exxon employed 58 managers of the same race and color as the plaintiff and
approximately 12% of Exxon's staff was the same race and color as the plaintiff.
Id. The plaintiff claimed that this finding by the Specialist was in error because
the plaintiff, whom the Specialist never met, was a light-skinned black, while the
Specialist was a dark-skinned black. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the Specialist's
findings were clouded by his erroneous perceptions of the plaintiff as a dark-
skinned black, and this resulted in discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff in the
investigation of his charge against Exxon. Id. The district court indicated that
the plaintiff failed to allege any act of discriminatory conduct under § 1981 or
Title VII based on his race or color. Id. at 2-4. The court noted that even as-
suming he could meet this burden, his claim against the Specialist for intra-ra-
cial, color-based discrimination was not cognizable under any statute. Id. at 4.
988 [Vol. 35: p. 983
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based discrimination generally adopt one of two postures. Some are of
the view that Title VII expressly does not embrace this cause of action.3 3
One possible explanation for this view is that in the early 1960s, when
Title VII was being developed, discrimination between blacks and
whites was the primary national concern. It is possible that this back-
drop to Title VII's enactment has led the courts to conclude that Con-
gress did not consider questions of intra-racial discrimination in
connection with Title VII. These courts thus refuse to give the statute a
meaning that Congress did not expressly intend at the time it was
enacted.3 4
Other courts have adopted an alternative view in which they recog-
nize that intra-racial, color-based discrimination exists and that Title VII
is a potential remedy, but they still do not allow the claim because of the
typically weak evidence supporting the plaintiff's allegations of color-
based discrimination.3 5 A fitting example is found in Ali v. National Bank
of Pakistan.3 6 The plaintiff in that case was a light-skinned citizen of the
Punjab province of Pakistan.3 7 He brought an action against the bank
where he was employed, alleging that the bank discriminated against
him in favor of darker-skinned employees from the Sind province of
Pakistan.3 8 The district court concluded that even if it were to accept as
true the plaintiff's contention that his light skin placed him in a pro-
tected class for Title VII purposes, it would nevertheless be compelled
to deny the plaintiff's claim because he failed to meet his burden of
33. See id. ("The distinction which plaintiff attempts to create based on skin
complexion finds no support under any relevant statute.").
34. This type of reasoning can be seen with respect to other questions of
interpretation under Title VII. For example, in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., the plaintiffs alleged discriminatory treatment by their employer
because of their sexual preference. 608 F.2d 327, 328-29 (1979). They sought
relief under Title VII, arguing that "in prohibiting certain employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of 'sex,' Congress meant to include discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation." Id. at 329. The court rejected their claims, finding
no congressional intent in the legislative history to support the conclusion that
sex discrimination was meant to include anything other than gender discrimina-
tion. Id. at 329. The court therefore held that Title VII "should not be judicially
extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality." Id. at 329-30.
35. See, e.g., Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611, 613-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Title VII would apply to discrimination based on skin color,
but plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of Title VII employment discrimi-
nation or applicability to his situation). The problem of potentially insufficient
evidence can be seen in Walker as well. The plaintiff there presented no direct
evidence of discriminatory motive on the part of her supervisor, but rather
sought to have the court infer that her supervisor was prejudiced towards light-
skinned blacks. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 404-05.
36. 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
37. Id. at 611-12.
38. Id. According to the evidence adduced at trial, a number of other Pakis-
tani employees were light-skinned and predominated in lower-paying bank posi-
tions. Id. at 612.
7
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showing disparate treatment.3 9
The distinction drawn by the courts between inter-racial and intra-
racial discrimination suits under both Title VII and section 1981 appears
to be based mainly on the perception that allowing such a cause of ac-
tion would result in insurmountable problems of proof that are not pres-
ent in inter-racial suits. Because the courts feel that they can objectively
discern the different skin colors in an inter-racial suit between, for exam-
ple, black and white parties, an inference of discrimination is easier to
maintain. When the parties are members of the same race, however,
and the difference between them is perhaps only a slight difference in
skin tone, it is much more difficult for the courts to accept that invidious
discrimination may have occurred. 40 Moreover, the courts are hesitant
to allow this cause of action in light of Congress's silence on whether
intra-racial, color-based discrimination suits have any place in Title VII
or section 1981 litigation, and the consequent lack ofjudicial precedent
resulting from that silence.4 1
In Sere v. Board of Trustees,42 the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois faced the issue of whether a black individual could bring
an action, under section 1981 or Title VII, against a member of his own
race alleging discrimination on the basis of a variation in skin pigmenta-
tion.4 3 The plaintiff in Sere was a Nigerian black; his supervisor was an
39. Id. at 614. The court noted:
While differences in complexion exist between [the plaintiff] and other
employees of the Bank... and the literal language of the statute which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "color" would seem to apply to
[the plaintiff's] claim, the testimony regarding skin color variations
among the peoples of Pakistan does not suffice to merit the division of
Pakistanis into distinct "protected classes" according to color.
Id. at 613. Disparate treatment occurs under Title VII when an employer, union
or employment agency overtly accords different treatment to individuals based
exclusively on their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. J. FRIEDMAN &
G. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 70-71 (2d ed. 1987).
40. See, e.g., Sere v. Board of Trustees, 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(court recognized substantial problems of proof involved in measuring differ-
ences between skin tone of parties), aff'd, 852 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988).
41. See id. (court did not allow claim because of lack of precedent). It is
interesting to note that two of the court's asserted justifications-problems of
proof and lack of precedent-have been advanced in the past in the area of emo-
tional distress claims. For a discussion of how these perceived obstacles were
overcome in that area, see infra note 108.
42. 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. II1. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. Id. at 1546. In Sere, the plaintiff claimed that the University of Illinois
discriminated against him on the basis of race, national origin and color when it
refused to renew his employment contract for the next school year. Id. at 1543,
1546. He based his suit on both Title VII and § 1981. Id. at 1543. The plaintiff
in Sere was of a darker hue than the primary defendant, his supervisor. Id. at
1546. Thus, although the issue was intra-racial, color-based discrimination, in
Sere it was the dark-skinned plaintiff who brought the suit. Id.
In Walker the roles were reversed with the darker-skinned defendant the
purported discriminator. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 404-05. For a discussion of
Walker, see infra notes 49-84 and accompanying text. The Sere court ultimately
990 [Vol. 35: p. 983
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American black with lighter skin color.4 4 According to the plaintiff, his
supervisor refused to renew his contract after the plaintiff did not suc-
cumb to pressure to relinquish his job voluntarily. 45 The individual who
replaced the plaintiff was also of lighter skin pigmentation. 4 6 The Sere
court recognized that discrimination based on skin color can occur
among members of the same race, but concluded that it lacked prece-
dent to allow the plaintiff to proceed with his suit under section 198 147
The court was unwilling to "create a cause of action that would place it
in the unsavory business of measuring skin color and determining
whether the skin pigmentation of the parties is sufficiently different to
form the basis of a lawsuit." '48
It was exactly this "unsavory business" that the District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia undertook in Walker.
III. WALKER V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
The plaintiff in Walker was a light-skinned black woman employed as
a clerk-typist in the Internal Revenue Service's Atlanta Office. 49 Her su-
pervisor, with whom she was in constant conflict, was a dark-skinned
black woman. 50 Upon the recommendation of her supervisor, Walker
was fired for the following reasons: "1) tardiness to work; 2) laziness;
3) incompetence; and 4) attitude problems." 5' Walker alleged that
these reasons were fabricated, and that the actual reason for her dis-
charge was her supervisor's personal hostility towards her because of
her lighter skin.5 2 Walker brought an action against the Internal Reve-
nue Service pursuant to Title VII and section 1981 alleging that her ter-
mination was due to invidious discrimination on the part of her
supervisor, and that it constituted retaliation for a complaint she had
dismissed the § 1981 count, and held that the Title VII count properly stated a
claim of national origin discrimination. Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546. For a discus-
sion of the § 1981 count, see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
44. Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546.
45. Id.
46. Id. The plaintiff alleged that his replacement was also less qualified
than he for the position. Id.
47. Id. The court stated that the "plaintiff is unable to offer any authority
for the novel proposition that such discrimination may form the basis of a cause
of action under § 1981." Id. The court did allow the plaintiff to proceed on his
Title VII discrimination claim, but only because the court felt he had "stated a
valid cause of action for national origin discrimination." Id. (emphasis added).
National origin discrimination is listed as a prohibited employment practice
under Title VII. For the relevant text of Title VII, see supra note 3.
48. Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546.
49. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 404.
50. Id. The rest of the employees in the office were predominantly black as
well. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 404-05.
1990] NOTE
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lodged with an Equal Employment Opportunity program manager. 53
The defendant moved for summary judgment with respect to all of
Walker's claims, maintaining that Title VII and section 1981 do not al-
low a cause of action for discrimination based on color.54 The court
granted the defendant's motion with respect to the section 1981 claim,
stating that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employment
discrimination. 55 Thus, the remainder of the court's opinion focused on
the plaintiff's Title VII claims of invidious discrimination and
retaliation.5 6
The district court first addressed the question of whether color-
based, as opposed to racial, discrimination is an actionable claim under
Title VII.5 7 The defendant contended that "[allthough [Title VII] in-
cludes 'color' as one of the bases for prohibited discrimination, the term
has generally been interpreted to mean the same thing as race," and,
therefore, color-based discrimination is not an actionable claim.5 8
Relying on the explicit language of Title VII and judicial interpreta-
tions of section 1981, the court concluded that color discrimination is a
cognizable claim independent of race.5 9 The court noted that "Title VII
was amended in 1972 to provide generally that 'all personnel actions
affecting employees . . . shall be made free from any discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' "60 In light of the
Supreme Court's policy that "the plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive," the fact that Title VII refers separately to both race and
color was sufficient for the court to reject the defendant's argument that
color should be interpreted as synonymous with race for Title VII
53. Id. at 405. The case was originally heard by a magistrate, following the
usual procedure in Title VII cases. Id. The district court also ruled on a claim
that Walker brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 701-706 (1988). Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405. This claim was dismissed follow-
ing the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. The court stated that
"[tihe APA does not create substantive rights on which a claim for relief can be
based." Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
54. See Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405.
55. Id. at 409 (citing Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976)).
56. Since the focus of this Note is on intra-racial, color-based discrimina-
tion, Walker's claims of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII will not be
addressed. For a thorough analysis of retaliation claims, see C. ANTIEAU, supra
note 4.
57. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405-07.
58. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 28, at 8-9.
59. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405-07.
60. Id. at 406 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)(1982)) (emphasis in original).
Additionally, the court noted the Supreme Court's statement of the purpose of
Title VII: "To assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406 (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (emphasis in Walker)).
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purposes. 6 1
To bolster its position, the Walker court cited with approval Vigil v.
City of Denver.62 The Vigil court had stated that section 1981 "is properly
asserted where discrimination on the basis of color is alleged." 6 3 The
Walker court relied on section 1981 case law like Vigil for its decision
regarding Title VII's applicability to the suit because it concluded that
"the legal elements and facts necessary to support a claim for relief
under Title VII are identical to the facts which support a claim under
§ 1981." 64
The Walker court also relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji.65 In Saint Francis,
the plaintiff, a United States citizen born in Iraq, alleged that his em-
ployer, a Caucasian, discriminated against him on the basis of race in
violation of section 1981.66 The question for the Court was whether this
allegation of discrimination, based as it was on the plaintiff's Arabian
ancestry, was sufficient to constitute racial discrimination within the
meaning of section 1981.67 The defendant, stating that Arabs are now
considered to be within the Caucasian race, contended that section 1981
does not permit a suit between members of the same race, and that the
plaintiff therefore could not assert a claim of racial discrimination under
61. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 109
S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (1989)). The Walker court stated that it was
left with no choice but to conclude, when Congress and the Supreme
Court refer to race and color in the same phrase, that "race" is to mean
"race," and "color" is to mean "color." To hold otherwise would
mean that Congress and the Supreme Court have either mistakenly or
purposefully overlooked an obvious redundancy.
Id.
62. Id. at 407. For a discussion of the facts of Vigil, see supra notes 23-26
and accompanying text.
63. Vigil, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8000, at 6938. The Walker court also
noted that "[t]he stated purpose of § 1981 is the 'protection of citizens of the
United States in their enjoyment of certain rights without discrimination on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.' " Walker, 713 F. Supp. at
405 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (emphasis in
Walker)).
64. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405 (citing Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697
F.2d 928, 935 & n.6 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826; Caldwell v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1980)). This Note contends
that the court was mistaken in this determination. For a more thorough discus-
sion of the reasons why judicial approaches to the two statutes cannot be com-
mingled, see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
65. 481 U.S. 604 (1987). In Saint Francis, the plaintiff was a citizen of the
United States born in Iraq. Id. at 606. He alleged in his complaint that he was
denied tenure as a professor because of his Arabian ancestry. Id.
66. Id. at 607.
67. Id. The plaintiff in Saint Francis had also alleged a Title VII violation,
but the district court dismissed the claim as untimely. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Fran-
cis College, 523 F. Supp. 386, 387-88 (W.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 784 F.2d 505 (3d
Cir. 1986), aft'd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
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that statute.6 8
The Court stated that the defendant's argument was based on the
erroneous assumption that "all those who might be deemed Caucasians
today were thought to be of the same race when § 1981 became law in
the nineteenth century." 69 Citing dictionaries and encyclopedias of the
nineteenth century and the legislative history of section 1981, the Court
concluded that, at the time section 1981 became law, race was defined in
terms of ethnic groups and common ancestry. 70 Moreover, the Court
concluded that Congress intended section 1981 to prohibit intentional
discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics. 7 1 These find-
ings provided the impetus for the Court to affirm the appellate court's
holding that section 1981 " 'at a minimum' reaches discrimination
against an individual 'because he or she is genetically part of an ethni-
cally and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo-sapiens.'-"72
The Court noted, however, that a "distinctive physiognomy is not essen-
tial to qualify for § 1981 protection."'7 3
The Court's holding was a product of its struggle to interpret sec-
tion 1981 so that it would allow a cause of action for ethnic discrimina-
tion, yet still not allow a plaintiff to assert discrimination on the basis of
place of birth (i.e., national origin).74 The Court remanded the case so
that Al-Khazraji could attempt to "prove that he was subjected to inten-
tional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather
than solely on the place or nation of his origin." 7 5
68. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 609. The defendant argued that the plaintiff
was, in actuality, alleging national origin discrimination, not racial discrimina-
tion. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 514 (3d Cir. 1986),
aft'd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). "The defendants argue that because Arabs are taxo-
nomically Caucasians, they are therefore 'white citizens' for purposes of Section
1981 and a fortiori, Section 1981 offers them no greater protection than they
enjoy absent Section 1981." AI-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 514. As noted earlier, the
prevailing judicial view on § 1981 is that it is not available for claims of national
origin discrimination. For cases espousing the unavailability of § 1981 as a rem-
edy for national origin discrimination, see supra note 24.
69. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 610.
70. Id. at 610-11. For example, the Court cited the Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana which, in 1854, referred "to various races such as Finns, . . . gypsies....
Basques .... and Hebrews." Id. at 611 (citations omitted). In addition, the
legislative history of § 1981, which can be found in the debates surrounding its
predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, supports this broad definition of race,
as it contains references to the Scandinavian, Chinese, Latin and Gypsy races,
among others. Id. at 612.
71. Id. at 613.
72. Id. (quoting Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 785 F.2d 505, 517 (3d
Cir. 1986)).
73. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added). The Court likened national origin discrimination
to "place or nation of [birth]" to distinguish it from the type of discrimination
that it believed AI-Khazraji experienced, which was based more on the fact that
he was born into a group called "Arabs" than the fact that he was born in Arabia.
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The Walker court reasoned that "[a] person's color is closely tied to
his ancestry and could result in his being perceived as a 'physiognomi-
cally distinctive sub-grouping (sic) of homo sapiens,' which in turn could
be the subject of discrimination." 76 Thus, in light of the Saint Francis
and Vigil decisions and the plain language of Title VII, the Walker court
concluded that color-based discrimination is an actionable claim. 77
The court next discussed whether Title VII or section 1981 allows a
cause of action for color-based discrimination where the plaintiff alleges
discrimination by a member of the same race. The defendant argued
that there simply was no cause of action available to a light-skinned
black person for color-based discrimination against a dark-skinned black
person, essentially because such suits had been rejected under both Ti-
tle VII and section 1981 in the past. 78 The court relied mainly on Saint
Francis in concluding that a claim, such as Walker's, is indeed actiona-
ble. 79 The court reiterated the Saint Francis Court's pronouncement that
"'a distinctive physiognomy is not essential' " to establish a claim under
section 1981.80
Although the Walker court realized that the determination of
whether there is a sufficient difference in skin tone between the parties is
a difficult and uneasy task, it simply stated that "the issue is a question of
fact that must be determined by the fact finder." 8' Thus, the court con-
cluded that it was "not controlling that in the instant case a black person
is suing a black person."'8 2 It is not clear, however, whether the court
was referring only to claims pursuant to Title VII or to claims pursuant
to either Title VII or section 1981.
Finally, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Saint Francis had
determined that "Congress intended § 1981 to apply to all forms of dis-
Id. This distinction is tenuous at best, and will serve as a fatal trap for § 1981
claimants who do not meticulously phrase their pleadings.
76. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406 (quoting Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613).
77. It is not clear, however, whether the Walker court held that such a claim
is actionable only under Title VII, or whether it is also actionable under § 1981.
As noted earlier, the plaintiff's § 1981 claim was dismissed, yet the court based
its decision almost exclusively on § 1981 case law. See supra note 55 and accom-
panying text. Therefore it is possible that the Walker court would extend its
holding to cases where § 1981 is properly pleaded.
78. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 28, at 8-9.
79. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 407-08. The court never made clear, however,
whether it was referring to a cause of action under only Title VII or under both
Title VII and section 1981.
80. Id. at 408 (quoting Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613). The court stated that
this was a "particularly relevant fact to the case at hand." Id. at 406.
81. Id. at 408.
82. Id. In holding that a black person may sue another black person under
Title VII, the court relied on the fact that protection under § 1981 did not re-
quire a distinctive physiognomy, according to Saint Francis. Id. The pertinent
statute in Walker, however, was Title VII, not § 1981. Id. at 405. This distinction
apparently did not seem to trouble the court. For a discussion of the improvi-
dence of this approach, see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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crimination including acts of discrimination against groups including
Finns, gypsies, Basques, Hebrews, Swedes, Norwegians, Germans,
Greeks, Finns, Italians, Spanish, Mongolians, Russians, Hungarians,
Chinese, Irish and French. '" 83 The Walker court cited this to demon-
strate that society recognizes that discrimination occurs between the var-
ious sub-groups of the Caucasian and Mongolian races. Summing up its
feelings for the defendant's position in strong words, the court thus con-
cluded that "[iut would take an ethnocentric and niive world view to
suggest that we can divide caucasians into many sub-groups but some
how all blacks are part of the same sub-group."
8 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The Walker court was in a difficult position. It wanted to provide a
remedy for this type of discrimination but had no precedent on which to
rely. Accordingly, it searched for the Supreme Court decision most
closely akin to the facts before it and stretched that decision to justify its
determination that Walker had stated a cognizable claim. Ultimately,
the Walker court's decision was a just one, opening an avenue for legal
recourse where one was undoubtedly needed. The court's nearly exclu-
sive reliance on Saint Francis was misplaced, however, for several
reasons.
In relying on Saint Francis, the Walker court mistakenly treated Title
VII and section 1981 as the same statute and incorrectly commingled
Title VII and section 1981 analyses. The two statutes are not inter-
changeable in this manner, Walker notwithstanding. There is a funda-
mental difference between Title VII and section 1981 where color-based
discrimination is advanced as a cause of action.8 5 Title VII's language
expressly includes "color" discrimination as a prohibited activity.86 Sec-
tion 1981 does not mention "color," but rather focuses on discrimina-
tion that denies an individual certain rights enjoyed "by white
citizens." 8 7 Besides the obvious difference in language, there are also
83. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 407 (citing Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 611-13).
84. Id. at 407-08. The court pointed out that "[tihere are sharp and distinc-
tive contrasts amongst native black African peoples (sub-Saharan) both in color
and in physical characteristics." Id. at 408.
85. Note, however, that the district court in Walker stated that "in a suit
such as this one, the legal elements and facts necessary to support a claim for
relief under Title VII are identical to the facts which support a claim under
§ 1981." Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405 (citations omitted). The court cited two
cases for this proposition: Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 935 n.6
(11 th Cir.) (when plaintiff predicates liability under Title VII on disparate treat-
ment, legal elements of claim identical to those of § 1981 claim), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 826 (1983) and Caldwell v. Martin Marietta Corp., 632 F.2d 1184, 1186-87(5th Cir. 1980) (facts necessary to support claim under Title VII nearly identical
to facts which support claim under § 1981). Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 405.
86. For the relevant text of Title VII, see supra note 3.
87. For the text of § 1981, see supra note 4. The courts generally have
equated § 198 I's language with racial discrimination. See Runyon v. McCrary,
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substantial differences between Title VII and section 1981 in adminis-
trative exhaustion requirements and remedies.8 8 Moreover, Title VII
applies only to discrimination in employment; section 1981 has no such
restriction. Given these differences, a section 1981 test is not relevant to
the question of whether a plaintiff can recover for color-based discrimi-
nation under Title VII. The Walker court ignored these distinctions
when it based its Title VII decision on the section 1981 holding in Saint
Francis. The Walker court apparently determined that a Title VII analysis
and a section 1981 analysis were equivalent, so that case law construing
section 1981 controls the determination of a Title VII cause of action.
This is an erroneous conclusion. As the Supreme Court has stated:
"Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private em-
ployment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elabo-
rate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII." 89 In addition, at
least one court has rejected the contention that section 1981 and Title
VII are coextensive and some courts have specifically held that section
1981 does not provide a remedy for color-based discrimination. 90 The
Saint Francis Court's test for section 1981 cases was not designed to en-
compass non-ethnic, intra-racial discrimination, and, therefore, it should
not be extended into areas it was not designed to remedy. 9 1
This is not to say that section 1981 is not a feasible remedy for in-
tra-racial, color-based discrimination in certain circumstances. 9 2 This
427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976) (Section 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of private contracts.") (footnote and citations omitted);
see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966) ("The legislative history of
[§ 198 11 clearly indicates that Congress intended to protect a limited category of
rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality.").
88. See Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981). Croker rejected
the "contention that section 1981 liability is coextensive with liability under title
VII." Id. at 989. The Croker court stated that "[t]he detailed administrative pro-
cedures through which a title VII claim is intended to pass, the limitation of title
VII's coverage to discrimination in the area of employment, and the language of
title VII distinguish title VII from section 1981." Id. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). For a thorough discussion of the differences between Title VII and
§ 1981, see Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662, 665-67 nn.17-19 (1975).
89. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975) (empha-
sis added).
90. See Croker, 662 F.2d at 989. For a more thorough discussion of Croker,
see supra note 88. For a discussion of one court's view that § 1981 does not
serve as a remedy for color-based discrimination, see supra note 21.
91. Furthermore, applying the Saint Francis test to Title VII actions raising
claims of intra-racial, color-based discrimination may result in greater hesitancy
on the part of the courts to grant relief. Those judges who do not view § 1981
as a remedy for color-based discrimination may be less inclined to grant relief if
they are compelled to apply a § 1981 test. Instead, they may opt to join the
ranks of those who believe that intra-racial, color-based discrimination is not
actionable under Title VII. This would be an unfortunate result for those plain-
tiffs with valid Title VII causes of action.
92. Section 1981 can be used to remedy intra-racial, color-based discrimi-
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Note submits only that the Saint Francis interpretation of section 1981
should not have been extended to Walker's Title VII claim. Even as-
suming, however, that the Walker court was correct in its assessment that
the Saint Francis Court's interpretation of section 1981 should be applied
to Walker's Title VII claim, the Saint Francis test was incorrectly applied
to the facts of Walker. The Saint Francis Court held that section 1981
reaches discrimination directed at an individual because he is genetically
part of an ethnically distinct sub-grouping of homo-sapiens.93 The Walker
court obviously felt that the plaintiff met this test, even though she made
no allegations that she was ethnically distinct from her supervisor. The
plaintiff merely asserted that she was physiognomically distinctive-in
skin color.94 The court attempted to justify its analysis by arguing that
"[a] person's color is closely tied to his ancestry and could result in his
being perceived as a 'physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of
homo-sapiens,' which in turn could be the subject of discrimination." 9 5
The issue in Saint Francis, however, was not whether the claimant was
physiognomically distinctive-it was whether he was genetically and eth-
nically distinct. The Walker court had before it no evidence that the
plaintiff and her supervisor were ethnically distinct. The plaintiff, there-
fore, could not have met the Saint Francis test.
Most significantly, the Walker court should not have relied on Saint
Francis to resolve the specific question presented because Saint Francis
did not involve discrimination on the basis of color between members of
the same race, as did Walker.9 6 Discrimination based on color by mem-
bers of the same race is not the same as racial or ethnic discrimination,
and should not be treated in a similar manner. This type of discrimina-
tion is not based on a view that one individual is inferior to another
because he or she is genetically different, or has a different ethnic ances-
try. The basis of this type of discrimination is even more complex. It
appears to be grounded in the resentment an individual feels when a
nation. For a discussion of one suggested approach, see infra notes 109-36 and
accompanying text.
93. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613.
94. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 404-05. The plaintiff did not present any direct
evidence that her supervisor was prejudiced against light-skinned blacks, but
rather presented evidence that her supervisor harbored resentful feelings to-
wards whites and sought to have the court infer that her supervisor was thus
prejudiced against light-skinned blacks. Id. at 405. Contrast this to the plaintiff
in Sere v. Board of Trustees, who alleged that he was a dark-skinned Nigerian black,
while his lighter-skinned supervisor was an American black. Sere, 628 F. Supp.
1543, 1546 (N.D. I11. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988).
95. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406.
96. Saint Francis was concerned with whether a person of Arabian ethnicity
could use § 1981 to remedy discrimination directed at him by other Caucasians.
Thus, although it was, like Walker, a case of intra-racial discrimination, the plain-
tiff and the Court were both focused on the ethnic aspects of the discrimination
and not on any difference in skin color between the plaintiff and the defendants.
For a discussion of Saint Francis, see supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
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member of his own race is treated more favorably by others simply be-
cause he looks more like a member of the dominant or favored race. In
the context of intra-racial discrimination between blacks, the situation in
Walker, the darker-skinned black feels that he has been "sold out" by his
lighter-skinned counterpart. He feels two layers of oppression: the first
from prejudice by whites, and the second from members of his own race
who are not as oppressed because of their lighter skin color. This type
of discrimination can work in reverse as well, with the lighter-skinned
black, who is viewed more favorably by the white majority, expressing
hostility towards the darker-skinned black in order to disassociate him-
self from his own minority race and thereby protect his favored status.
Regardless, though, of the proponent of the discriminatory acts, such
intra-racial color-based discrimination has no basis in ancestry, ethnic-
ity, or race, and it cannot be measured by the same standards.
Finally, the Walker court's decision has left open the question of
whether section 1981 alone may be used as a remedy for intra-racial,
color-based discrimination. Although the court based its Title VII deci-
sion on section 1981 case law, it never specifically stated whether its
holding would apply to cases where section 1981 was the only available
remedy. This is a particularly important distinction because of the dif-
ferences in section 1981 and Title VII in terms of coverage and statutes
of limitations. Thus, if a plaintiff maintains a suit only under section
1981 because a Title VII claim is time-barred, will Walker apply?
C. A Suggested Approach to Intra-Racial, Color-Based Discrimination Suits
What, then, are the proper approaches to an intra-racial, color-
based discrimination suit under Title VII or section 1981? Relying on
Saint Francis for a Title VII decision obviously creates more problems
than it solves, and it is submitted that the Saint Francis test is not even
the appropriate way to approach a section 1981 action.9 7 Nevertheless,
the issue of intra-racial, color-based discrimination must be addressed.
The first step is to undo the damage done by the Walker court in com-
mingling Title VII and section 1981 analyses. They are separate and
distinct statutes and cannot be used interchangeably.
1. Title VII. Let The Plain Meaning Prevail
Title VII explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of color.98
The Supreme Court, speaking on Title VII, has stated that in general
terms "[wihat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers oper-
ate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
97. For a discussion of an alternative approach to § 1981 intra-racial, color-
based discrimination suits, see infra notes 109-36 and accompanying text.
98. For the relevant text of Title VII, see supra note 3.
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impermissible classification. '"99 Surely a court could allow a Title VII
cause of action for intra-racial, color-based discrimination based solely
on the plain meaning of the statutory language and case law of Title VII
alone, without any reference to section 1981.100 Title VII should be
available as a means of redress for any type of discrimination that sets up
an arbitrary barrier to employment if the discrimination falls within one
of Title VII's prohibited categories. If the express language of Title VII
prohibiting color discrimination cannot be brought to bear on situations
such as that in Walker, then arguably the prohibition serves no purpose
in the statute. If Congress had intended that only racial, gender, national
origin, and religious discrimination should be eradicated, then the inser-
tion of the word "color" is superfluous. The Walker court similarly be-
lieved that color had a specific purpose:
This court is left with no choice but to conclude, when Con-
gress . . .refer[s] to race and color in the same phrase, that
"race" is to mean "race," and "color" is to mean "color." To
hold otherwise would mean that Congress and the Supreme
Court have either mistakenly or purposefully overlooked an ob-
vious redundancy.' 0 '
Since it does not take an expansive reading of the statute to include this
type of discrimination within its prohibited categories, using Title VII to
remedy intra-racial, color-based discrimination is conceptually less diffi-
cult to envision than section 1981. In addition, at least one court has
intimated that Title VII could provide a proper remedy if the facts of the
case before it were appropriate. 102 Given these factors, there is no need
to borrow an interpretation of section 1981 in order to decide a Title
99. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (tests required as
condition of employment held invalid under Title VII because discriminatory in
operation by disqualifying blacks at substantially higher rates than whites).
100. The Walker court easily could have taken this stance. The court ap-
peared to have done that initially when it referred to the "plain meaning" of the
statutory language, and cited Felix v. Marquez, an earlier case in which a plaintiff
was allowed to utilize Title VII to remedy color discrimination. Walker, 713 F.
Supp. at 406 (citing 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,279 (D.D.C. 1980)). The
court thus could have based its decision on these two factors, without further
reference to § 1981.
101. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406.
102. In Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan, the court hinted that the literal lan-
guage of the statute would allow a plaintiff to assert a claim of intra-racial, color-
based discrimination, but the facts of the case before it did not warrant its use.
508 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Interestingly, one court that had re-
jected the use of § 1981 to remedy this type of discrimination did so, in part,
because it viewed problems of proof as insurmountable. See Sere v. Board of
Trustees, 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ii. 1986), affd, 852 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1988).
For a discussion of Sere, see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. The
Walker court recognized "full well that such difficulties are genuine and substan-
tial. Nevertheless, the court must find that the issue is a question of fact that
must be determined by the fact finder." Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 408. Arguably,
problems of proof are poor reasons for denying a remedy. If more cases like
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VII case.103
It has been argued that an expansion of Title VII to include this
type of discrimination would open up the "floodgates of litigation.""14
This is a genuine concern, but it is not a valid reason for withholding a
necessary remedy. As one court noted: "[T]he existence of a multitude
of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal redress."'' 03 It
has also been argued that the problems of proof arising out of these
cases would be insurmountable. Interestingly, the problems of proof
that the courts envision are largely caused by the way these cases are
approached. Judges seem to think that they would have to measure the
skin tones of the litigants to see if they are different enough to form the
basis of a lawsuit.' 0 This measuring is unnecessary. The courts need
only focus on the plaintiff's proof. If the plaintiff proves that he was
discriminated against because of his skin color, it does not matter how
many shades apart the plaintiff and defendant are. After all, the issue is
discrimination. The courts have drowned themselves in a quagmire of
"protected class" analyses in Title VII (and also section 1981) cases,
trying desperately to develop all-inclusive criteria for membership in the
various protected classes, only to find that the criteria are unwork-
able.10 7 This Note proposes that courts should instead focus on what
the defendant has done, and not on the plaintiff's status.' 08
Walker were allowed to proceed, the courts could fashion ways of dealing with
proof as they have in other areas of the law such as emotional distress claims.
103. For a discussion of the practical differences between § 1981 and Title
VII that preclude such "borrowing," see supra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text.
104. The defendant in Walker argued:
To expand Title VII protection to every individual who has a different
skin tone without the limitation of a clearly identifiable subgroup which
has experienced a history of disparate treatment would make each indi-
vidual into a protected class since no two individuals are of the same
skin tone as others of their race, whether they be black, white, or
oriental.
Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 28, at 9-10.
105. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 735 n.3, 441 P.2d 912,917 n.3, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 77 n.3 (1968).
106. See Sere, 628 F. Supp. at 1546. For a discussion of the difficulties the
Sere court perceived in measuring the skin tones of the parties, see supra notes
42-48 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of three divergent views on protected class member-
ship criteria in the context of § 1981 suits and how those criteria have served to
only confuse the issue, see infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
108. In addition, as more cases of this type are heard, the courts will be
better able to fashion judicially manageable standards of proof as they have in
other areas of the law. For instance, in the area of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claims, courts in the past had refused to allow recovery for those
persons not in the "zone of danger." See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
.Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 302-03, 379 P.2d 513, 517-18, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38(1963). As the prevailing judicial view on the issue changed, however, courts
discarded the zone of danger requirement, and devised new standards of proof
for dealing with these claims. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739-41, 441
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2. Section 1981: Focus on the Discriminatoy Acts
Section 1981 is much more troubling than Title VII in terms of its
application to intra-racial, color-based discrimination suits. i0 9 Although
its plain language is sufficiently broad to include this type of discrimina-
tion, it has been interpreted by the courts in a narrow fashion. I1 As the
courts have struggled to decide which groups may invoke section 1981
for relief, three distinct tests have emerged."I ' They are: (1) the com-
mon perception of the community test; (2) the objectively nonwhite skin
color test; and (3) the membership in an objectively verifiable distinct
class test.1 12
The common perception test is based on the way members of the
community-at-large view the section 1981 claimant." 3 If the commu-
nity commonly views the claimant as belonging to a "distinct minority,"
then the claimant can assert a section 1981 action, regardless of whether
he or she is taxonomically a member of the same race as the defend-
ant." 4 This approach seems equitable since the existence of discrimina-
tion is determined with respect to the plaintiff's own community. It has,
however, the deleterious effect of allowing claims only when "the poor
anthropology of the defendant[] coincide[s] with the poor anthropology
P.2d 912, 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79-80 (1968). Similarly, the courts will be
able to devise standards for dealing with intra-racial, color-based discrimination.
109. There are, however, many advantages to a potential plaintiff in choos-
ing § 1981 over Title VII in remedies, statutes of limitations, and administrative
exhaustion requirements. For a more thorough discussion of the relationship
between § 1981 and Title VII, see Larson, The Development of§ 1981 as a Remedy
for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56, 63-65
(1972); Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 615 (1969).
110. Traditionally, § 1981 has been judicially limited to claims of inter-ra-
cial discrimination. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 170 (1976)
(§ 1981 forbids all racial discrimination in making of private and public con-
tracts); Waller v. International Harvester Co., 578 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (§ 1981 applies only to race discrimination).
111. For a complete discussion of the scope of these tests, see Note, Civil
Rights: Qualifying for Protection Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, 41 OKLA. L.
REV. 151, 157-162 (1988) (discussing origin of § 1981 and how courts have con-
strued it to prohibit only racial discrimination).
112. Note, supra note 111, at 158.
113. Id. The theory behind this test is that "[pirejudice is as irrational as is
the selection of groups against whom it is directed. It is thus a matter of practice or
attitude in the community .... " Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968,
971 (10th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). For a discussion of Manzanares, see infra
note 114.
114. Note, supra note 11, at 158. The leading case espousing this view is
Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc. See 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979). In that case,
a Mexican-American was permitted to assert a § 1981 claim for relief, even
though he was taxonomically a Caucasian, because members of the community
perceived Mexican-Americans to be nonwhite; thus the racial discrimination re-
quirement of § 1981 was met. Id. at 971-72.
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of the community at large."' "15 Thus, under this test, a cause of action
will not be allowed, even in cases of intentional discrimination, when the
community-at-large does not perceive the plaintiff to be a member of a
"distinct minority." ' 16
The second test involves determining whether the claimant's skin
color is perceived as nonwhite." '7 As one commentator has stated: "If
the pigmentation [of the plaintiff] were such that it might be perceived
as nonwhite, the plaintiff could invoke section 1981."' 18 This approach,
like the common perception test, also involves the determination of how
others view the claimant, although it is arguably more objective.' 19
The third test requires the section 1981 claimant to plead member-
ship in a distinct group that has historically received less favorable treat-
ment. 120 This test, more than the previous two, directly focuses on
delineating those groups that qualify for section 1981 protection.' 2 '
Taken together, these tests clearly evince the courts' preoccupation
with focusing on the status of the plaintiff instead of on the nature of the
defendant's discriminatory acts. The Supreme Court's decision in Saint
Francis gives even more weight to this practice by predicating use of sec-
tion 1981 on membership in a group that is, at a minimum, "ethnically
115. Note, supra note 111, at 166 n.124.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 160. This test is often used when courts have difficulty determin-
ing "prevalent subjective community perceptions." Id.
118. Id.; see Garcia v. Gardner's Nurseries, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 369, 374-75
(D. Conn. 1984) (perception of Puerto Ricans as nonwhite held sufficient to
state claim).
119. Note, supra note 111, at 160. This test appears to be slightly more
objective than the common perception test because, at a minimum, the court
must look at the plaintiff and defendant and compare their skin tones. See id. It
is submitted, however, that the court is in a sense substituting its perception of
the plaintiff for the community's.
120. Id. at 161; see LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824
(D. Colo. 1978). In LaFore, the court required the Mexican-American plaintiff to
prove that he belonged to an identifiable class that received less favorable treat-
ment than a historical class called "white citizens." Id. at 826. Judge Kane
wisely thought that § 1981 should not be limited merely to claims of inter-racial
discrimination because "[e]quating 'white citizens' with a racial classification is
utterly lacking in sophistication. There is no scientific justification for the equa-
tion and its use inevitably leads to irretrievable confusion." Id.
121. See Note, supra note 111, at 161. The courts' struggle to delineate
those groups that are entitled to § 1981 protection stems largely from the vague
wording of § 1981 itself. Section 198 I's reference to rights "enjoyed by white citi-
zens" has caused the problem. The interpretation of that phrase has led to the
three judicial tests enunciated above. Such confusion is surprising given the leg-
islative history of the phrase. It was added to prohibit the statute from giving to
women and minors rights that they did not possess before its enactment. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 app. (1866). As Representative Wilson, who
added the phrase in an amendment, said: "[Tihe words are intended to operate
as a limitation and not as an extension." Id. Given that the words were added
only to limit the statute's application to women and minors, there is no point in
the courts' efforts to interpret them in ways that delineate protected classes.
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and physiognomically distinctive."' 122 The problem with such an ap-
proach is that the definitions of a "race," an "ethnicity," and even a
"color" have never been clear, and are still constantly evolving.' 23 In
addition, one commentator has argued that the federal courts have so
many conflicting views on what groups can avail themselves of section
198 l's protection that the statute does not provide protection equally to
all plaintiffs. 124 Consequently, a better approach in section 1981 suits
would be to focus on the defendant's discriminatory motive alone, with-
out reference to the plaintiff's status in any definable group. 125
Judge Wilkinson took just such an approach in his dissenting opin-
ion in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb. 126 In Shaare, a group of neo-
Nazis desecrated a synagogue. 12 7 The Congregation brought, inter alia,
a section 1981 action against the group.' 2 8 The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit denied the Congregation relief, concluding that, be-
cause Jews are not considered a separate race, the defendants' actions
could not have been racially motivated. 12 9 In effect, the Congregation's
122. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613.
123. As Judge Kane stated in LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co.:
The Encyclopaedia Brittannica lists nine races and suggests the
possibility of a tenth. The categories are delineated on the basis of tax-
onomic characteristics which are genetically transmittable such as
blood traits, hair form and chemical composition. Further, races are sub-
ject to evolution: some vanish, some new ones emerge and all change.
Suffice it to say that an analysis based upon questionable concepts
of race is not productive.
448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978) (emphasis added). For a discussion of
LaFore, see supra note 120.
124. See Case Comment, Beyond a Black and White Reading of Sections 1981 and
1982: Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823,
854 (1987). Perhaps if the Supreme Court shifted its focus to the defendant's
actions, all victims of discrimination would receive equal treatment under
§ 1981. Id.
125. It has been suggested that "a plaintiff [should] be able to invoke
[§ 1981] protection if the defendant's discriminatory acts have racial content.
The content is racial if the acts communicate that the plaintiff is a member of a
group that shares a genetic makeup distinct from some comparative group."
Case Comment, supra note 124, at 849 (footnote omitted). Such a proposal
would be applicable, with slight modification, in the case of intra-racial, color-
based discrimination suits brought under § 1981. A claimant should be able to
state a cause of action under § 1981 if he can prove that the defendant's acts
communicated to him that the defendant viewed him as not being a true mem-
ber of the black race, and, as such, exhibited the same hostility towards the
plaintiff that he exhibited towards members of the white race.
126. 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
127. Id. at 524-25.
128. Id. at 525. The Congregation also brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 and 1985(3), as well as common law trespass, nuisance and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1981 claim because it concluded that state ac-
tion was required where a claim is predicated on the language in § 1981 giving
the right to parties to the "full and equal benefit of the laws." Id. at 525-26.
129. Id. at 526-27. The majority concluded that the defendants' actions
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claims were rejected because "the victims did not actually belong to the
distinct racial class in which defendants placed them."' 3 0
Judge Wilkinson rejected this approach in a forceful dissent.' 3 1 He
argued that for purposes of discrimination suits under section 1981, the
only relevant factor was the defendants' subjective intent.t 3 2 He argued
that it should not matter if the plaintiff was not in reality a member of a
distinct race, noting that it would be "preposterous to require that [the
defendants'] beliefs be objectively true before the federal law provides
protection.... [Ilt is precisely because such beliefs are false and repre-
hensible that federal civil rights laws were enacted."' 133 Finally, Judge
Wilkinson noted that "[t]he focus on the subjective intent of the actor
reflects the reality that discrimination and prejudice is grounded in erro-
neous perceptions." ' 3 4
This is the proper judicial approach to intra-racial, color-based dis-
crimination claims under section 1981.135 In much the same way that a
member of the Jewish faith cannot control the fact that some individuals
perceive him to be of a distinct race, neither can a light-skinned black
individual control the fact that others may perceive him to be more like a
member of the white race than his own race. Thus, if a plaintiff can
prove that the defendant intended to discriminate against him because
he views him as more like a member of the white race, and hence trans-
fers the hostility he feels for whites to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
should be considered as having asserted a proper claim under section
1981.136
were not racially motivated, even though the Congregation presented a substan-
tial amount of evidence showing that the defendants mistakenly believed that
Jews were a distinct race. Id. at 529 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
130. Id. at 532 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Judge Wilkinson, however, did agree that the "full and equal benefit"
clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires state action, and therefore he agreed with
the majority's dismissal of that claim. Id. at 528 n. 1 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). His separate opinion focused on § 1982, but em-
phasized that his discussion of racial discrimination under that section "applies
with equal force to § 1981 where other predicates for § 1981 coverage are estab-
lished." Id. (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 533 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Wilkinson argued: "Permitting the subjective belief of defendants to give
a claim the 'racial character' necessary to bring it within the civil rights statutes
thus not only ensures adequate coverage but also avoids in many cases the diffi-
cult and troubling task of drawing racial lines." Id. (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 530 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. To date there have been no decisions allowing a plaintiff to proceed
on the sole basis of the defendant's subjective perceptions.
136. Interestingly, a plaintiff in a § 1981 action must prove discriminatory
intent. This requirement was announced by the Supreme Court in General
Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). Note,
supra note 111, at 167 (citing General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 388). The
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V. CONCLUSION
The Walker court, despite its flawed analysis, rendered a vitally im-
portant decision. Discrimination is as dynamic a concept as race or
ethnicity, 13 7 and the scope of our federal civil rights laws must change to
fit today's changing types of discrimination, regardless of the form the
discrimination takes. 13 8
In all likelihood, it will take years and many adverse decisions
before there is federal legislation directed at intra-racial, color-based
discrimination. In the meantime, the courts must provide the only
means of redress through existing Title VII and section 1981 remedies.
While courts must have some manageable standards to apply during this
period, the Walker court's analysis should not be viewed as the correct
approach because of its commingling of section 1981 and Title VII anal-
yses. The Walker court must be applauded, however, for being the first
court in the nation to realize that color-based discrimination is no less
injurious when it occurs between members of the same race. The Walker
court has provided the much sought-after precedent in this area; now let
us hope that other courageous courts will move still further towards the
Note's author recognized that "the absolute necessity of proving the defendant's
intent overcomes the perceived problem that recognizing claims based on na-
tional origin will cause an explosion of litigation." See id. at 167. A similar ra-
tionale can rebut arguments that anticipate an explosion of litigation under
§ 1981 intra-racial, color-based discrimination claims. The § 1981 plaintiff will
always have to prove that the defendant acted intentionally to discriminate on
the basis of color, and this requirement will "weed out" frivolous claims. See id.
at 168.
137. See Case Comment, supra note 124, at 853 ("As the ethnic makeup of
society changes, racial perceptions change accordingly. Consequently, society
tends to categorize people into new racial groups. For this reason, rigid defini-
tions of race are no longer effective tools for determining the scope of coverage
under section[] 1981 ...."). For a concise discussion of the changing concepts
of race and ethnicity, see the Supreme Court's decision in Saint Francis College
v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4, 611 (1987).
138. An example of the changing nature of discrimination is the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., where the Court
held that whites as well as blacks could use § 1981 as a remedy for discrimina-
tion. 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976). Before that decision, the lower federal
courts were split on the question of whether § 1981 applied to discrimination
against white persons. Compare Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205,
211 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (§ 1981 does not apply to whites) and Perkins v. Banster,
190 F. Supp. 98, 99 (D. Md.) (same), affd, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960), with
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971) (§ 1981 does apply to
whites), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) and Central Presbyterian Church v.
Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (same). It is not
that discrimination against whites never existed before the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Santa Fe; rather, the Court decided to recognize it by allowing § 1981 to
protect white victims of discrimination. Therefore, it is no answer to say that the
lack of precedent in the area of intra-racial, color-based discrimination is a valid
reason for denying a remedy. On the contrary, the courts should recognize that
this new type of discrimination exists and that Title VII and § 1981 are appropri-
ate remedies.
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